Fighters, associates, and others who have been detained or abducted have been fleeing Boko Haram since 2015. And, since the death, this year of Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the Boko Haram faction Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah lid-Da'wati wa'l-Jihad, have risen substantially — particularly in Cameroon and Nigeria.
This has given a window of opportunity for the Lake Chad Basin governments to encourage further defections and weaken the radicals in their battle against the terror group and its affiliates.
Niger's government offered voluntary surrender and amnesty to Boko Haram fighters in the Diffa area in the southeast in 2016. On 4 February 2019, the Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Decentralisation, Customary and Religious Affairs issued an order establishing a receiving center in Goudoumaria for those linked with Boko Haram who willingly surrendered.
The legal foundation of the center, whose construction began in February 2017, was formalized by this order, which was based on the Diffa region's crisis exit strategy and the framework document for the handling of Boko Haram associates' surrender.
Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDRRR) of Boko Haram affiliates was a priority for the Lake Chad Basin governments in the 2018 regional stabilization. The Lake Chad Basin Commission was in charge of this, with help from the African Union.
According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Niger's outreach has presented some Boko Haram affiliates with a way out. The center's socio-economic rehabilitation program has assisted at least 375 ex-Boko Haram associates, including 30.
Two years after the first cohort graduated, there are still unanswered issues concerning the ex-associate's reintegration into host communities and the program's future. Using the outcomes of this initiative to enhance its impact on Boko Haram-affected areas would be beneficial.
The Goudoumaria receiving center, which is under the Ministry of the Interior's jurisdiction, has a maximum capacity of 500 persons. Its goal is to welcome ex-Boko Haram members and help them reintegrate into society through religious re-education, re-socialization, and vocational training in a variety of disciplines. The DDRRR process is overseen by the Presidency's High Authority for Peacebuilding, with the help of local authorities and development partners.
Ex-associates get an exit and professional training certificates, an installation kit, and, in the case of the first group, a 50,000 CFA installation stipend at the conclusion of this training and emotional assistance. They also take a Quranic pledge to repudiate violent extremism as a group.
Awareness-raising seminars were held to aid ex-associate's reintegration while also taking into account the requirements of the host communities. Also developed was a socio-economic assistance program for 600 youngsters from the host communities. These were designed to aid and enhance their resistance against violent extremism.
ISS interviews with DDRRR recipients following graduation from the center, as well as program implementing partners and local governments, reveal a slew of issues.
Beneficiaries cited a lack of information about the length of their stay in Goudoumaria, as well as the sluggish pace with which the program was implemented, as issues with the rehabilitation component of the program.
From July 2017 until December 2019, the initial group of roughly 243 persons stayed at the center. The duration of their stay made some of them feel incarcerated, causing grievances that allegedly led to escapes from the center. The delay, according to officials, was caused by difficulties in gathering funds to open the center. The necessity to explain the program's legal structure and qualifying requirements, notably those pertaining to amnesty, slowed things down even more.
Some beneficiaries reported they had little trouble reintegrating into their host communities in Diffa as part of the reinsertion and reintegration component.
However, the ex-associates encountered several financial difficulties. The majority of them were unable to sustain themselves by practicing the profession in which they were educated. Some had sold their equipment and were surviving on a piecemeal basis. Certain of the professions in which they had been trained were not marketable, and in some cases, the economy had already been squeezed by the crisis. Others complained that the installation costs they got were insufficient.
Some persons still affiliated with Boko Haram have been deterred from defects as a result of this feedback. Two program participants are said to have returned to the group as a result of it. Others who had considered it afterward changed their minds out of fear of being executed for treason by Boko Haram.
Despite the formation of a monitoring mechanism based on communal peace committees and community leaders, ex-associates have expressed dissatisfaction with the authorities' lack of assistance and lack of frequent monitoring following their departure from the center. For individuals living in isolated Diffa settlements, surveillance is much less effective.
Members of the regional monitoring committee interviewed indicated they functioned on a volunteer basis and lacked the material and financial resources to fully monitor ex-associate's reintegration.
While women have several roles in Boko Haram besides reproductive and domestic, some respondents indicated they could only participate in the program as the spouses or children of militants, rather as full beneficiaries. This undervaluation of women's roles in the group reflects long-held preconceptions that may make the program less appealing to female viewers.
Furthermore, despite the fact that recipients were separated by gender at the center, at least one incidence of rape was documented. According to Nigerien officials, this single incidence illustrates the necessity for additional measures to safeguard women and girls during the DDRRR process.
Following the initial group, the second group of around 46 persons arrived in October 2020 and left seven months later — a shorter stay than the first group. This was due to a lack of and fluctuating funding from the state and its partners, which had an impact on the operations and program of the center.
The reduced term was also due to suggestions made at a Diffa workshop in December 2020. The necessity to establish the duration of the rehabilitation program at the center, for example, was one of them. This would offer better transparency and predictability.
Following the termination of the initiative to support the rehabilitation of ex-Boko Haram associates, which only obtained money for the rehabilitation of the first group, the number of vocational training possibilities for the second group was decreased from nine to six. The second group did not get psychological support, which is critical for coping with potential trauma and reintegrating peacefully into host communities.
The rollout of an adapted curriculum for the third group housed at the center is now hampered by a shortage of finance.
The Nigerien government, as well as the governments of other Lake Chad nations, should recognize the difficulties experienced in executing the DDRRR program, which undermines Boko Haram by depriving it of key people resources.
This is critical in order to limit the danger of recidivism and re-enlistment in Boko Haram, which would jeopardize regional peace and stability.
Senior Researchers, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel, and the Lake Chad Basin, Jeannine Ella Abatan and Remadji Hoinathy
The International Development Research Centre, the UK Conflict Resolution, Stability and Security Fund, and the Hanns Seidel Foundation all contributed to the publication of this study.
